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WARSAW CONVENTION - A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNDER OLD SECTION 17: A LOOK AT
Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of May 5, 1983, Eastern Airlines flight 855 left
Miami en route to Nassau in the Bahamas.' During the flight, one
of the three engines of the Lockhead L-1011 lost oil pressure and
was shut down.2 With only two engines of the airplane operable, the
crew decided to return to Miami. Unfortunately, the second and third
engines failed soon thereafter. Without power, the airplane quickly
lost altitude and the passengers were informed that it would have to
be "ditched" into the Atlantic Ocean.3 After several attempts, the
crew was able to restart the engine that had initially failed and safely
land the plane at Miami International Airport.4
Following the incident, twenty-five separate actions were instituted
by passengers of flight 855' against Eastern Airlines under Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention, the principal treaty addressing interna-
tional air travel.6 The cases were consolidated in the federal district
court of the Southern District of Florida in Miami.7 In the consol-
idated suit the plaintiffs claimed damages for mental distress arising
out of the incident. However, the consolidated case was dismissed
N.Y. Times, May 6, 1983, at A14, col. 1.
All of the engines were later found to be missing O-rings, critical components
of each engine. It was the responsibility of the plane's mechanic to inspect them
after each flight. Id.
The plane was carrying 162 passengers and ten crew members. Its last engine
failed at approximately 16,000 feet and the tail engine was not restarted until the
plane fell below 4,000 feet. Id.
4Id.
I Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989). Two of the suits
were filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, but
were subsequently removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania based upon diversity jurisdiction. The remaining actions were filed in
the Florida state court, there being no diversity of citizenship present in any of the
cases.
6 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934) reprinted in 49 U.S.C. sec. 1502 (1976) (hereinafter
Warsaw Convention). Some of the cases also pled state law causes of action.
I See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407(a) (the multi-district litigation consolidation statute).
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for failure to state a cause of action because of the plaintiffs' failure
to allege that any physical injury had occurred.8 On appeal, in Floyd
v. Eastern Airlines, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the case after determining that the precedents on which
the trial court had relied incorrectly interpreted the Warsaw Con-
vention. 9 It held that the lower court should have interpreted the
term lksion corporelle by using its French legal meaning which pro-
vides for recovery for purely emotional injuries unaccompanied by
physical trauma.'0
The Floyd case frames some of the difficult questions concerning
the interpretation of the Warsaw Convention." Before the case can
be analyzed, however, a brief survey of the development of inter-
national air law with respect to passenger liability claims against air
carriers will be examined. The evolution of aviation law will be traced
from the ratification of the first treaty governing international air
travel to the treaty's most recently proposed amendments. The dif-
ferent methods of interpretation used by various courts-including
the United States Supreme Court-will then be analyzed in deter-
mining the proper means of interpreting the treaties. The decisions
analyzed have involved several interpretative approaches, each often
reaching inconsistent results.
The analysis will then address which rules of treaty interpretation
should correctly apply, and will apply those rules to the issue of
whether emotional injuries unaccompanied by any physical trauma
are compensable injuries under the Warsaw Convention. Arguments
will be presented in support of the decisions which hold that the
French legal meaning is binding and allows recovery for such emo-
tional distress. The paper concludes that in light of recent decisions
I In Re Eastern Airlines, Engine Failure, Miami International Airport on May
5, 1983, 629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986). The two plaintiffs sought leave to
amend their complaints to allege physical injury resulting from the events on the
flight. These motions were denied.
9 872 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1989).
10 872 F.2d at 1480.
When connected with a physical injury, ["mental anguish or injury") in-
cludes both the resultant mental sensation of pain and also the accompanying
feelings of distress, fright, and anxiety. In other connections, and as a
ground for divorce or for damages or an element of damages, it includes
the mental suffering resulting from the excitation of the more poignant
and painful emotions, such as grief, severe disappointment, indignation,
wounded pride, shame, public humiliation, despair, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979).
1 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1462.
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and the better reasoned interpretative doctrines, the Floyd 'court
correctly decided that the French legal meaning of lksion corporelle,
which provides that mental injuries unaccompanied by physical trauma
are indeed compensable under the Convention, should control the
construction of the Warsaw Convention.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air 2 (hereinafter Warsaw Convention
or Convention) is the principal treaty that addresses air carrier liability
arising from international air transportation." Originally signed by
twenty-three countries in 1929, 4 the Convention has been ratified by
12 2. Warsaw Convention, supra note 6.
'1 Note, Air France v. Saks: An Accidental Interpretation of the Warsaw Con-
vention, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195 (1986) (hereinafter American University
Note). Articles 1 and 3 state the threshold requirements for the Convention to apply.
Article 1(1) provides: "This convention shall apply to all international transportation
of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally
to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an air transportation enter-
prise."
Article 1(2) provides:
For the purposes of this convention the expression "international trans-
portation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract
made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment,
are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,
or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of another power, even though that party is not a
party to this convention. Transportation without such an agreed stopping
place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or
authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not'be deemed to be
international for the purposes of this convention.
Article 3(1) provides:
For the transp6rtation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger
ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places...;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, arts. 1(1), 1(2), and 3(1).
'4 With the exception of the United Kingdom, the original signatories were all
civil law countries. Warsaw Convention, supra note 6. Stanculescu, Recovery for
Mental Harm under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: An Interpretation of
Lhsion Corporelle, 8 HASTNGS INT'L & COMip. L. REv. 339 (1985).
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many other countries, with the United States complying in 1934.1'
Presently, over 120 nations are signatories. 16
Shortly after ratifying the Convention, the United States criticized
it as being too beneficial to the airline industry at the expense of
individual plaintiffs, and proposed modifications. The most contro-
versial changes involved air carrier tort liability limitation. 7 Many
countries felt that the limitation was too low while others saw no
reason for a change. As a result of this growing dissention among
the various signatory nations, representatives reconvened in The Ha-
gue to discuss a possible amendment to the Convention in 1955. The
United States favored raising the $8,000 U.S. limit on recoverable
damages allowed under the Convention.' Negotiations nearly broke
down; and after two of its proposals were rejected, the United States
threatened to denounce the treaty.' 9 The countries finally signed an
agreement, however, which doubled the original liability limitations
11 The United States was neither represented at nor an original signatory of the
Warsaw Convention. Warsaw Convention, supra note,6. The Convention is self-
executing, requiring no implementing legislation by the signatories; therefore, the
terms of the Convention itself are controlling. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984). The Convention was later modified by the
Montreal Agreement, a contractual variance between the major airlines with de-
partures, arrivals, or connections in the United States. Civil Aeronautics Board
Agreement No. 18900, Agreement Relating To Liability Limitations Of The Warsaw
Convention And The Hague Protocol (1966), approved by Civil Aeronautics Board,
Order No. E-23680, reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) (hereinafter Montreal
Agreement).
6 2 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AR LAW (A)17-25 (4th ed. 1984) (listing
the countries adhering to the Warsaw Convention).
11 See generally Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497 (1967). The limitation set by the Convention
was the equivalent of about $8,000 U.S. The provision which contained the liability
limitation stated:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each
passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance
with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, damages may be
awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value
of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by
special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit
of liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22(1).
11 The United States originally moved to raise the limitation on liability to $25,000,
but later reduced its proposed figure to $20,000. Comment, The Revised Warsaw
Convention and Other Aviation Disasters, 8 CUMB. L. REv. 764, 768 (1978) (here-
inafter Cumberland Comment).
,9 Id., The final agreement raised the limitation to just $16,000, approximately
doubling the previous amount.
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of the Convention. This treaty amendment became known as the
Hague Protocol. 20
The United States remained dissatisfied with the Convention, how-
ever, and in 1965 formally denounced the treaty. 2' A State Department
press release indicated that the United States would retract its notice
of denunciation before it took effect if a higher limitation on recovery
could be agreed upon. 22 This change could have been effected either
through a contractual agreement among the various air carriers in-
volved or by a revision of the Convention itself. 23 In February of
1966 the various signatory nations met in Montreal to address this
issue. 24 An agreement was reached to raise the liability limit to ap-
proximately $75,000 U.S. 25 As a quid pro quo for this heightened
standard, the carriers agreed to waive the due care defense provided
by Article 20(1) of the Convention, 26 thereby imposing virtual strict
liability on the carriers. 27 The agreement, entitled the Montreal Agree-
ment, 28 remains valid today.
20 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (hereinafter
Hague Protocol).
21 Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention governs the procedure for denouncing
the treaty. The article states:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention
by a notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,
which shall inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of
denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have
proceeded to denunciation.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 39; see Lowenfeld and Mendelson supra
note 17 at 546-52.
2 Cumberland Comment, supra note 18, at 771. The text of the notice was
printed in Press Release No. 268, Nov. 15, 1965, 50 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923, 929
(1965).
23 Cumberland Comment, supra note 18, at 771.
24 Note, Aviation Liability Limitations for Wrongful Death or Personal Injury-
A Contemporary Analysis of the Warsaw System, 10 BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 381,
386 (1984).
23 Id. at 387. The new limitation, equivalent to $75,000 U.S., includes legal fees
and costs.
26Article 20(1) provides: "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he
and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it
was impossible for him or them to take such measures."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 20(1).
27 The defense of passenger contributory negligence was retained. Comment,
Aviation Law: Attempts to Circumvent the Limitations of Liability Imposed on
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In 1971, negotiations between signatory nations resulted in another
agreement entitled the Guatemala Protocol. It attempted to raise the
liability limitations imposed by the Montreal Agreement, while adopt-
ing the same standard of strict liability. 29 Unlike the Montreal Agree-
ment, the Protocol would have required the member nations to adopt
the Protocol. It was not a contractual agreement among the air
carriers, but an attempt to revise the Convention itself.30 Unwilling
to accept the terms of the Protocol, the United States refused to
ratify it. Although it does bind the nations which have adhered to
it, it has no binding effect in United States courts. 3'
Following these amendments, other revisions to the treaty have
been frequently submitted. The most recent attempts have come via
the proposed Montreal Protocols 3 and 4.32 Their effect would have
been to increase the liability limitations while removing the exceptions
allowing recovery in excess of the limitations in cases involving willful
misconduct, or failure to give notice of the limitations.3 3 The United
States Senate, however, refused to ratify either Protocol.34 Conse-
quently, the Montreal Agreement has remained the only modification
of the Warsaw Convention that is currently recognized by the United
States.
Injured Passengers by the Warsaw Convention, 54 CmI.-KENTr. L. REv. 851, 853
(1978) (hereinafter Chicago-Kent Comment).
Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement 18900, Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitation of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol (1966), approved by
Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. E-23680, reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966)
(hereinafter Montreal Agreement).
The Warsaw Convention allows a special contract (such as the Montreal Agree-
ment) to raise the liability limitation imposed by the Convention. Article 22(1)
provides in pertinent part: "Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the
passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note
6, art. 22(1).
" Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971) (hereinafter Guatemala
Protocol).
Id. The Guatemala Protocol also exempted the airlines from liability for injuries
resulting solely from a passenger's pre-existing physical condition. Comment, Saks:
A Clarification of the Warsaw Convention Passenger Liability Standards, 16 U.
MIAI INTER-Am. L. REv. 539, 543 (1985) (hereinafter Miami Comment).
31 Several possible reasons exist for the failure to ratify. One may have been that
the $100,000 limitation on liability was felt to be inadequate. Another reason may
have been that the airline industry successfully lobbied to bar such ratification.
Chicago-Kent Comment supra note 27, at 854.
32 Miami Comment, supra note 30, at 543.
11 De Vivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?, 49
J. Am L. & CoM. 71, 75 (1983).
129 CONG. Rc. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
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Although numerous attempts have been made to amend the Con-
vention, most proposals to modify the air carrier liability regime have
involved the liability limitations. The other provisions have remained
virtually unchanged since the Convention was first promulgated.35
The original provisions, the result of two international air confer-
ences, 36 addressed and achieved two primary goals: a uniformity of
rules regarding commercial air travel and a limitation of air carrier
liability for accidents associated with international air travel. 37
The first of these goals was achieved by two different methods.
First, the Convention itself provided a uniform body of rules by
which to establish the legal rights of international air carriers, pas-
sengers and shippers. 38 Second, from a practical standpoint, the only
official version of the Convention ratified by the signatory countries
was the French language draft, thereby providing the ultimate textual
authority for purposes of construction. 39 The framers' intention was
to achieve a uniform application of the treaty by recognizing only
one official language to which to refer for interpretive solutions.4
The United States recognized this goal and in turn ratified only the
official French version of the treaty.4' An English translation was
31 American University Note, supra note 13.
- The First International Conference of Private Air Law, held in Paris in 1925,
adopted a resolution creating an International Technical Committee of Aerial Experts.
(In French, Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridiques A6riens (CITEJA)).
The committee was formed to study problems connected with private liability in the
international operation of aircraft and to codify the law in area. The Second
International Air Conference on Private Air Law reconvened in 1929 in Warsaw to
consider the CITEJA studies and deliberations. It adopted the committee proposals
and thereby established the Warsaw Convention. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 17, at 498. Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical
Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. AIR L. & CoM. 27, 30-36
(1932).
17 American University Note, supra note 13, at 196-97; Warsaw Convention, supra
note 6, at preamble..
38 The terms of the Convention regarding the second goal of limiting air carrier
liability provided that the maximum recovery for an air travel-related accident was
originally established at 125,000 Poincar6 Francs (about $8,300 U.S.). This limit
was subsequently increased to $75,000 by the Montreal Agreement of 1966, and
then to $100,000 by the Guatemala Protocol of 1971, which has not yet been ratified
by the United States. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 499.
19 French was the predominant working language in international diplomatic
relations at the time of the Convention. American University Note, supra note 13,
at 210.
40 Id. A single copy of the French version of the Convention was deposited with
the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 36.
41 The United States adhered to the Convention pursuant to Article 38, but subject
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provided by the Department of State along with the French version
to the United States Senate at the time of ratification; but the English
version was not ratified and should therefore not be authoritative. 42
United States courts, nevertheless, have at times used the English
translation as a "quasi-official" authority in their deliberations. Their
resulting decisions have raised the specter of inconsistent interpretation
and have drawn criticism from legal scholars.4 1
Such interpretive difficulties have haunted United States courts
because no generally accepted rules of treaty interpretation have been
promulgated or recognized to guide their analyses." As a result of
to the reservation that the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention not apply
to international transportation performed directly by the state. Warsaw Convention,
supra note 6, art. 38; 78 CONG. REc. 11,582 (1934).
Warsaw Convention, art. 2(1), provides: "This convention shall apply to trans-
portation performed by the state or by legal entities constituted under public law
provided it falls within the conditions laid down in Article ." Warsaw Convention,
supra note 6, art. 2(1).
42 78 CONG REc. 11,587 (1934) (Senate approving resolution of ratification sup-
porting adherence to the French version of the Warsaw Convention by voice vote
without floor debate).
43 McKenny, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AnR L.
& Comm. 205, 207 (1963); Stanculescu, supra note 14, at 351.
4 Stanculescu, supra note 14, at 351-52. It should be noted that the United States
has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which arguably
would impose a narrower, more textual mode of treaty construction than that
mandated by the Supreme Court. An interesting issue is raised when nations party
to a treaty expressly endorse different methods of its construction. Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 28, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
arts. 31, 32.
Article 31 states:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
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this lack of uniform rules, two separate paths have been followed
by courts when deciding cases involving construction of the Con-
vention. 4 Courts following the first path have used only the English
translation in their analysis without regard to the legal meanings of
the corresponding French terms." Courts pursuing the other path
have recognized the French version as controlling their analysis and
have attempted to decipher the French legal meaning of each crucial
term.
47
The first path chosen by the United States courts has caused their
decisions to lack the interpretive uniformity that the drafters of the
Convention desired. 4 As a result, courts from most of the signatory
countries are applying the French legal meanings in deciding their
cases while some United States courts are applying an Anglo-American
common law meaning that is not necessarily the intent of the Con-
vention. 4This dilemma is especially evident in cases involving Article
intended.
Article 32 states:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article
31:*
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
41 Grippando, Warsaw Convention-Federal Jurisdiction and Air Carrier Liability
for Mental Injury: A Matter of Limits, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 59,
68-74 (1985). The author divides the approaches into two views which he calls the
"Preclusive View" and the "Non-exclusive View." Under the Preclusive View, the
range of permissible tort claims was limited, precluding suits if the mental injury
did not accompany bodily harm. Under the Exclusive View, any action seeking
recovery for injuries comprehended by art. 17 of the Warsaw Convention could be
brought only according to the Convention's conditions and limitations. Claims neither
explicitly nor implicitly covered by art. 17, however, could "give rise to causes of
action not subject to any of the conditions or limitations of the Warsaw Convention."
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport, 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Thus,
this language approves of an independent tort action for mental injury.
46 Grippando, supra note 45, at 68. This view precludes suits if the mental injury
does not accompany bodily harm, because bodily injury does not encompass mental
injury. If a different result were desired, the drafters could have used the term
"personal injury"-which would include both physical and mental injury.
41 Id. at 72-77. This view includes all judicial attempts to avoid preclusion,
including the Non-exclusive view and expansive interpretations of Article 17.
" Subsequent cases in other jurisdictions express dissatisfaction with earlier cases
using the preclusive view. Compare Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, 110 Misc.
2d 478, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1978) with Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
34 N.Y.2d. 385, 314 N.E.2d. 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
41 "Judicial disunification of a uniform law convention is practically unavoidable
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17 of the Convention in addressing carrier liability for tortious in-
jury.50 In those cases which have hinged on the meanings of the terms
found in Article 17,51 some United States courts have refused to use
the corresponding French terms to aid in interpreting and analyzing
the Convention.5 2 Instead, they have applied legal connotations to
the term as developed through the common law system of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. 53 Fortunately, in 1985 the United States
Supreme Court settled the conflict between the lower courts by af-
firming the requirement that courts look to the French legal meaning
of the term at issue.Y
In the landmark case of Air France v. Saks,5" the Supreme Court
implicitly adopted the view that the Warsaw Convention itself creates
a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court held that an airline pas-
senger who became permanently deaf because of the negligent main-
tenance and operation of an aircraft's pressurization system could
not avail herself of that cause of action because she was not a victim
of an "accident ' 56 for which the airline could be held liable under
where the convention is based on, or uses, concepts of a legal system, for which
no exact equivalent exists in other legal systems." Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diver-
sification of Uniform Private Law Conventions, 21 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 718, 737(1972) (including an in-depth contrast and comparison between the interpretations
of the Warsaw Convention by United States courts with the courts of other nations).
The English version of Article 17 reads:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger,
if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 17.
"1 The two most litigated terms from Article 17 of the Convention are "accident"
and "bodily injury." See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
S2 See, e.g., Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848,
358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974) (adopting the "ordinary meaning" approach to determine
the meaning of a disputed term or phrase); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,
351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (hereinafter Husserl 1) (using an interpretation
of the French terms to arrive at a meaning of the corresponding English translation,
not their French legal meaning), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); Kalish v. Trans
World Airlines, 89 Misc. 2d 153, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1007.
11 See Rosman 34 N.Y.2d at 385. The Court relies on the common and ordinary
meaning of "bodily injury" in reaching its conclusion that mental injuries unac-
companied by physical trauma are not compensable. Id.
14 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
55 Id.
6 Id. at 398. The Court distinguishes between an accident that causes injury and
one that is the injury. The French version of the disputed portion of Article 17 at
issue in Saks is as follows: "l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage." This phrase has
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the Convention. 7 In deciding this case, the Supreme Court set forth
the proper method by which United States courts are to interpret a
clause in an international treaty to which the United States is a
party. 8 The Court declared that "to determine the meaning of the
word 'accident' in Article 17 we must consider its French legal mean-
ing." 59 As a result, in future controversies, the lower courts will be
bound to consider the French legal meanings of the terms of the
Convention, instead of resorting to their common law meanings,
which could sometimes dictate different results.6
Although restating the rule for treaty construction, the holding in
Saks shed light only on the definition of the word "accident." ' 6' This
is not, however, the only Warsaw Convention term subject to diverse
interpretation.
The expression "bodily injury" as it is found in Article 17 has a
history of inconsistent and sometimes tortured construction by lower
courts 2 Two courts attempted to apply the French legal meaning of
the phrase, in conformity with Saks; and they reached opposite
results.63 The French phrase at issue in those cases was lksion cor-
been officially interpreted to mean "the accident which caused the damage." Warsaw
Convention, supra note 6, art. 17 (see both the French and English translations).
S7 Saks, 470 U.S. at 406-08; Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 17.
" The Court relied on prior decisions to guide it through the proper interpretation
of a clause in an international treaty to which the United States is a party. E.g.,
Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) ("treaties
are constructed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning
we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations,
and the practical construction adopted by the parties"); Maximov v. United States,
373 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1963) (analysis must begin with the text of the treaty and the
context in which the written works are used).
19 Saks, 470 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added).
60 According to the Saks Court, "this is true not because we are forever chained
to French law by the Convention, but because it is our responsibility to give the
specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of
the contracting parties." Id. at 398; see also Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
61 Saks, 470 U.S. at 398.
62 The French term Ision corporelle was officially interpreted to mean "bodily
injury" in the official translation of the Warsaw Convention located at 49 U.S.C.
sec. 1502 (1976).
61 Compare Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973)
(mental injuries are not compensable under the Warsaw Convention) with Palagonia
v. Trans World Airlines, 110 Misc. 2d 478, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (the
French legal meaning of lsion corporelle applies and controls and such term en-
compasses mental injury unaccompanied by physical trauma).
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porelle-4of which "bodily injury" is the corresponding official Eng-
lish translation. 65 A problem that has divided the courts constructing
this term is whether a cause of action exists under the Convention
for emotional injuries unaccompanied by physical injury. 66 Some
courts respond by declaring that "bodily injury" could in no way
encompass purely emotional trauma, while others find to the con-
trary. 67 To understand the state of the law concerning this part of
Article 17, the cases reaching inconsistent results should be examined
to determine whether they were analyzed correctly in light of Saks.
The leading authority holding that Article 17 does indeed contem-
plate recovery for mental anguish unaccompanied by physical trauma
is the New York District Court decision in Husserl v. Swiss Air
" France is a civil law country that recognizes two types of legally cognizable
injuries: physical injuries (dommage matkriel) and non-physical injuries (dommage
moral). The wording of Article 17 (lsion corporelle) strongly suggests that the
drafters did not intend to exclude any particular category of damages. If they had,
it seems likely that they would have referred to one of the two basic types of
damages, rather than using a term which does not readily evoke the sharp distinction
found in French law. G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL Am TRANSPORT 125
(1977).
13 The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a
passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 17 (emphasis added).
66No cause of action under the Warsaw Convention for any type of injury was
recognized by American courts after two cases that were decided in the 1950's by
the Second Circuit: Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d. Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957), and Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954). However, the trend of finding
that no cause of action existed under the Warsaw Convention was reversed after
the Noel case was overruled by Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
913, 916 (2d. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); see also In re Mexico
City Air Crash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 415 (9th Cir. 1983) (Warsaw
Convention does create a cause of action).
67 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d. 385, 314 N.E.2d. 848, 358
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974); see also Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, 110 Misc. 2d 478,
442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The Larousse dictionary defines "corporelle" as
"[P]ossessing a body (as opposed to spiritual)," or "concerning the human body."
The antonyms of the word are: "1. incorporal, spiritual; 2. intellectual, mental,
moral, psychic." 2 GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRAN;AISE 992 (1972) (translation
by author). The 1932 version of the Dictionary of the French Academy defines
"corporelle" as: "[h]aving a body .... [or] belonging to or pertaining to the body."
1 DIC ONNAIRE DE L'AcADMIEm FRAN AISE 303 (1932) (translation by author).
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Transport Co.6 (hereinafter Husserl I).69 That court rejected the
argument that the French legal meaning controls, but still found that
the types of injury enumerated in the Convention should be construed
expansively to include purely emotional trauma.70 Husserl II held that
the common law meaning of "bodily injury" includes purely mental
distress. This holding is an expansive interpretation that reaches a
broad and arguably beneficial conclusion from a policy standpoint,
but one analytically incorrect in light of Saks.71 Several other courts
have followed this decision, but none have added significantly to its
analysis .72
Another court has, however, engaged in an exhaustive analysis of
the French legal meaning of lksion corporelle. In Palagonia v. Trans
World Airlines,73 the New York Supreme Court relied on expert
testimony to conclude that lksion corporelle does include mental injury
absent physical trauma as the basis for recovery.74 In relying solely
on the French legal meaning, however, the court failed to examine
the prior and subsequent history of the Convention. 7 With regard
to treaty construction, the Supreme Court has previously declared
that "[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements,
and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words
to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical con-
struction adopted by the parties."' 76 Because the Palagonia court failed
to include an analysis of the Convention's history, some commentators
have concluded that its analysis was incomplete. 77 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's rule of analysis requires that such an approach be
" 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
69 The court in Husserl H reversed the previous holding in Husserl I interpreting
the French legal term Ision corporelle to encompass nervous shock and mental
suffering.
10 Husserl II, 388 F. Supp. at 1250.
1, Furthermore, Husserl II was decided before Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), the
incorrect analysis of which was based on the wrong premise that the Warsaw
Convention merely imposed limits on state law causes of action.
72 See Krystal v. British Overseas Air Transport Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D.
Cal. 1975); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
'3 Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, 110 Misc. 2d. 478, 442 N.Y.S.2d. 670 (Sup.
Ct. 1978).
14 Id. at 483, 442 N.Y.S.2d. at 675.
75 See supra text accompanying note 61.
76 Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)
(involving an interpretation of a treaty with the Choctaw Indians).
17 Stanculescu, supra note 14, at 353.
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made. An interpretation as required by Saks was followed in Pala-
gonia.78 Therefore, Palagonia remains valid and enforceable precedent
although failing to pursue an exhaustive analysis.7 9
In contrast, some courts have held that Article 17 does not provide
for recovery for purely emotional or psychological injuries unaccom-
panied by physical trauma.4 ° The leading case expressing this view is
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines."' The Rosman court used the or-
dinary meaning of the English terms "bodily injury" in reaching its
conclusion.8 2 The court stated that "[o]nly by abandoning the ordinary
and natural meaning of the language of Article 17 could we arrive
at a reading of the terms 'wounding' or 'bodily injury' which might
comprehend purely mental suffering without physical manifesta-
tion." 83 The court failed, however, to consider the French legal
meaning of the terms and even declared that "absolutely no dispute
exists over the proper translation of the liability provisions of the
Convention,'"' and that French law was therefore irrelevant in in-
terpreting the Convention once a proper translation was agreed upon.s
The analysis in Rosman has received considerable negative com-
mentary and must be questioned in light of Saks.8 6
However, the court in Burnett v. Trans World Airlines8 7 reached
the same conclusion as that expressed in the Rosman decision. How-
ever, unlike the court in Rosman, the Burnett court professed to use
the French legal meaning of the English terms "bodily injury." 8 The
Burnett court determined that the equivalent French definition for
"bodily injury" was "an infringement of physical integrity." 9 The
Is Saks, 470 U.S. at 392.
79 The Palagonia case has not been expressly overruled and it still stands as one
of the few court decisions handed down before Saks that interpreted the legal meaning
of the French term when deciding a case under the Convention.
0 See Husserl I, infra note 120 at 708; Gam, infra note 115 at 230.
8, Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d. 385, 314 N.E.2d. 848, 358
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
82 Id. at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
83 Id.
Id. at 393, 314 N.E.2d at 852, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
85 Id. at 394, 314 N.E.2d at 853, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
G. MILLER, supra note 65, at 117-22; Note, Recovery for Mental Anguish
Under the Warsaw Convention, 41 J. Am. L. & COM. 333, 336-38, 340 (1975)
(authored by J. Kathryn Lindauer).
87 Id.
8S Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
8 Id. at 1156.
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court held that since this definition gives no indication that mental
injuries should be included, the language of the treaty therefore does
not allow recovery for such injuries. 90
While Burnett appears to follow the mandate of Saks, it reaches
a conclusion at odds with that in Palagonia, which also appeared to
follow the mandate of Saks.9' The varying results reached by the
courts in attempting to follow Saks seems to show that whether a
particular plaintiff will recover for purely mental injuries will depend
on the court in which he brings suit. Fortunately, a federal circuit
court has recently ruled on this issue. Its thorough analysis of the
mandate prescribed by Saks indicates the correct procedure by which
a court must construe treaties drafted in a controlling foreign lan-
guage.
III. ANALYsis
In Floyd v. Eastern Airlines,92 the plaintiffs challenged a lower
court's holding that a claim could not be brought under the Warsaw
Convention for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 93 The
plaintiffs contended that the language of the treaty implicitly provided
a remedy for mental injuries and emotional distress unaccompanied
by physical trauma.94 In deciding this issue, the crucial determination
became the proper interpretation and analysis of the English trans-
lation, "bodily injury," of the French term "lesion corporelle."95
The plaintiffs claimed that the French legal meaning controlled and
that this meaning encompassed a claim for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress.96 Eastern argued that Article 17 of the Con-
vention does not provide a claim for purely emotional injuries. 97
The 1985 Supreme Court decision in Air France v. Saks98 clearly
dictates the method of treaty interpretation that the Floyd court was
goId.
9, The court in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (Husserl 1), also based its holding on reasoning similar to that of the Palagonia
court where it stated in dicta that mental anguish alone is not compensable under
Article 17.
872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
91 In re Eastern Airlines, Engine Failure, Miami International Airport on May
5, 1983, 629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
94 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1470.
95 Id. at 1471.
Id. at 1467.
Id. at 1479.
470 U.S. 392 (1985).
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
bound to employ in deciding the case. 99 A court "must" look to the
French legal meaning of the disputed Warsaw Convention term.1 °
Since Saks had only defined the term "accident," the Floyd Court
was faced with interpreting l6sion corporelle, for which no controlling
authority on point existed.' 0' Instead, the only authority available to
the court was conflicting persuasive authority, the analysis of which
was obsolete after Saks because of the decisions' reliance on English
interpretations. 0 2 After the Floyd court disposed of such cases, de-
claring their analyses flawed, 03 it moved on to discuss the two cases
which had used the French meaning of the appropriate terms in
interpreting the disputed terms.'04
First, the Floyd court examined Burnett v. Trans World Airlines05
where the New Mexico district court applied the French language
meaning of "bodily injury" to determine that lesion corporelle means
"an infringement of physical integrity."'0 This definition, held the
Burnett court, fails to give "the slightest indication that mental
injuries are to be included in its domain."'' 0 7 The court in Floyd,
however, correctly reasoned that the Burnett analysis only purported
to apply the French legal meaning of Article 17 (as required by
Saks).'08 Instead, the analysis was actually limited to the purely lin-
guistic meaning of the French terms at issue.'09 Because Burnett did
not determine the legal meaning of the phrase under French law, the
Floyd court found the analysis to be unpersuasive, and refused to
follow that decision.10
Next, the Floyd court turned to the New York state court decision
in Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines."' The Palagonia court ex-
99 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1470; see also Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,
386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
1o9 Saks, 470 U.S. at 399 (1985) (emphasis added).
101 No United States Supreme Court case nor Eleventh Circuit Court case has
addressed the issue in Floyd regarding the correct interpretation of I sion corporelle.
102 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1475-80.
103 Id.
104 Id.
1o 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
'- Id. at 1156.
107 Id.
,08 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1477.
,09 Id.; See, L. KREINDLER, 1 AVLATioN ACCIDENT LAW sec. 11.03[21[b] at 11-43
(1988).
11 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1477.
"1 110 Misc. 2d. 478, 442 N.Y.S.2d. 670 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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haustively analyzed the French legal meaning of Article 17.112 Relying
on expert testimony, the court concluded that lMsion corporelle does
allow recovery for mental injury, even absent any physical trauma."3
Although the Palagonia court did not examine the subsequent and
prior history of the Convention in arriving at its conclusion, the
Floyd court found its reasoning persuasive. After finding that the
Convention's subsequent and prior history supported the holding in
Palagonia, the Floyd court decided the case before it accordingly." 14
Although cases involving purely mental injuries are rare," 5 many
involve the common element of terrorism. 1 6 Admittedly, cases with
Floyd-like fact patterns will be infrequent. However, given the prev-
alence of airplane hijackings," 7 and the willingness of courts such as
Floyd to hold mental injury unaccompanied by physical trauma to
be compensable, it appears that Warsaw Convention claims involving
purely mental injury will not be brought infrequently. Indeed, several
cases have already been decided that have arisen in the context of
terrorist attacks, including Burnett, Husserl II, and Rosman."18
Interestingly, the first airplane hijacking is believed to have taken
place in 1931,' 9 years before the above mental injury cases were
decided. Unfortunately, since the Warsaw Convention was drafted
in 1929, before hijackings became an issue of concern, as noted in
Husserl II, airline hijackings were "probably not within the specific
,2 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1479.
113 Palagonia, 110 Misc. 2d. at 482, 442 N.Y.S.2d. at 675.
1"4Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1479-80.
"1 Gam, Liability Damages for Injuries Sustained by Passengers in the Event of
Hijacking of Aircraft and Other Violations of Aviation Security, 1988 LLoYD's MAR.
& COM. L.Q. 217, 230.
116 One definition of terrorism is: "terror inspiring violence containing an inter-
national element that is committed by individuals or groups against non-combatants,
civilians, states, or internationally protected persons or entities in order to achieve
political ends." Silets, Something Special in the Air and on the Ground: The Potential
for Unlimited Liability of International Air Carriers for Terrorist Attacks Under
the Warsaw Convention and its Revisions, 53 J. Am L. & CoM. 321, 322 (1978).
"7 One commentator has claimed that the world has "entered an 'age of terrorism,'
the pattern of which is unlike any other period in history when ideological and
political violence occurred." Y. ALEXANDER & S. F NGER, INTRODUCTION TO TER-
RORISM: INTERDISCPLINARY PERSPEcTws at xi (1977).
"I Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973); Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d. 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974); see also
Gam, supra note 115, at 228-29 (discussion of the three quoted cases with regard
to the "protected interests" of the Warsaw Convention).
119 Gain, supra note 119, at 217.
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contemplation of the parties at the time the Warsaw Convention was
promulgated . "...' "20 The increase in hijacking and terrorist incidents
in the last three decades has lead one commentator to declare that
the world has entered an "age of terrorism.' ' 21
While not specifically addressed in the original promulgation of
the Warsaw Convention, the subsequent Montreal Agreement mod-
ified the Convention and indirectly established that under the treaties
hijackings are considered "accidents," resulting injuries therefore
being covered by the Warsaw Convention scheme. 22 The main concern
in this area regarding the Convention is whether passengers whose
sole injuries are mental may recover damages therefore. 23 The hold-
ings on this issue have not been uniform-some courts holding that
such injuries are compensable and others holding that they are not.1'
After Saks and Floyd however, it appears that American courts will
be increasingly prone to find such injuries compensable. Similarly,
an Israeli court after the Entebbe hijackings found that purely mental
injuries are compensable, although the court found that there was
an inadequate interpretation of lesion corporelle under French law.'
The increasing propensity of courts to allow recovery for purely
mental injuries under the Warsaw Convention is not surprising given
the trend in recent years to award damages for an increasing number
of psychological and mental injuries.' 26 Additionally, developments
in medical technology have made it easier to distinguish simulated
from actual mental injuries, thereby facilitating evidentiary findings
in assessing mental injuries. 127 Today, the airline industry needs less
protection from excessive liability, an original goal of the Convention,
2 Husserl 1, 351 F. Supp. at 706.
121 Y. ALEXANDER & S. FINGER, supra note 121.
12 Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma, 1 SYR-
ACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 345, 346 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 23-27.23 Note, The Emotional Trauma of Hijacking: Who Pays?, 74 Ky. L. J. 599
(1986).
,24 Herman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d. 385, 400, 314 N.E.2d 848, 857
(1974) (holding that no damages are recoverable for the horror and mental suffering
in connection with a hijacking; however, damages are recoverable for mental injuries
so long as there are physical signs or symptoms of those mental injuries); Palagonia
v. Trans World Airlines, 110 Misc. 2d. 478, 479, 442 N.Y.S.2d. 670, 671 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (holding that damages are recoverable for purely mental injuries unaccompanied
by physical trauma).
121 Compagnie Air France v. Consorts Teichner, 39 RFDA 232 (Israel S.C. 1985).
121 Gain, supra note 119, at 231.
127 Id.
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because of the availability of liability insurance. 2 The court in Floyd
recognized the trend of exposing airlines to a wider scope of liability
and broadened it by allowing recovery for purely mental injuries
under the Warsaw Convention. 29
Since Floyd was decided, only one United States federal court has
addressed the issue of whether emotional trauma without accompa-
nying physical injury is recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. 30
In Gilbert v. Pan American World Airways the plaintiff sued Pan
Am for the emotional distress and mental anguish she suffered prior
to being struck by a "runaway bar cart."'' The district court of the
Southern District of New York applied the Floyd rule to find a valid
cause of action did exist and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
the jury's award of damages for mental injuries in her favor. 3 2 In
I's One of the original goals of the Warsaw Convention was to protect the interests
of the then fledgling airline industry. In 1929 the industry was young; but today
insurance can help defray any monetary liability incurred by an airline.
Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1479.
130 Gilbert v. Pan American World Airways, No. 85-4157 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1989)
(Westlaw, Genfed Library, Dist file). Another case that has relied on Floyd concerning
a matter unrelated to this note is In Re Alwan Brothers Co., 105 Bankr. 886 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1989). In footnote 7, the court relied on Floyd in deciding that the Warsaw
Convention does not provide a recovery for punitive damages.
"I No. 85-4157 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1989) (Westlaw, Genfed Library, Dist file).
That case involved a heavy wheeled bar cart that was unsecured during takeoff.
Plaintiff, Mrs. Gilbert, was a former airline stewardess traveling as a passenger of
the defendant at the time of the mishap. When she observed the unsecured bar cart,
according to the court, she understood not only that she was in danger, but also
that given the weight of the cart and the velocity with which it could be expected
to bear down upon her, she was in a position of very serious danger. She even
testified that she feared for her life, or that she would receive a maiming injury.
The court noted that "Mrs. Gilbert's prior experience uniquely qualified her to
understand the danger into which defendant's negligence had thrust her." The court
found that such emotional distress was compensable under the Warsaw Convention,
under Floyd; and it upheld the jury's verdict in favor of Mrs. Gilbert in the amount
of $25,000.
132 The court's finding that mental injury unaccompanied by physical trauma can
create a valid cause of action under the Warsaw Convention is in line with commentary
from other countries that have agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of
that treaty. Miller, Compensable Damages Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention, 1 Am L. 210, 211 (1976), citing, H. & L. MAzEAUD, & A. TUNc, TRAr
THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT CIVILE DtLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE,
416-17 (5th ed. 1957). When the Convention was drafted, any kind of damage, if
"certain" and "direct," could be compensated. Under French law, claims for mental
injury were recognized at the time that the Convention was adopted.
A British case also held that the official French text of the Convention prevails
when inconsistent with the English text. Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways,
1 Q.B. 616, 652 (1968).
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Gilbert the defendant had argued that "pre-impact emotional distress"
was a recoverable damage only if the plaintiff had a fear of death
and the fear was legitimate.'33 The court rejected that argument and
concluded that the plaintiff's damages were indeed recoverable under
the Warsaw Convention. 13 4
As a district court in the Second Circuit, the Gilbert court was
not required to follow the decision in Floyd, a decision handed down
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the New York
district court was persuaded to accept Floyd as a correct statement
of the law.' The well-reasoned Floyd decision should continue to
be followed in the future by courts that wish to determine the correct
interpretation of "bodily injury" under the Warsaw Convention.
Some recent foreign cases have also held that damages for purely
mental injuries are recoverable. In Compagnie Air France v. Consorts
Teichner, the Israeli Supreme Court allowed recovery for purely
mental injuries under the Warsaw Convention, despite the lack of
an adequate basis under French law by which to interpret the term
lksion corporelle to include such injuries.3 6 The court based its de-
cision on a finding that the prerequisites of the Convention had been
changed dramatically by the development of civil aviation, thus ne-
cessitating the general extension of liability for mental injuries.'"
Unfortunately, whether damages are recoverable under the Conven-
tion for mental injuries has rarely been addressed by courts outside
of the United States. 38 In fact, all judgments recognizing purely
mental injuries as recoverable under the Convention have been handed
down by United States courts, with the exception of Consorts Tei-
chner.39 It should be noted that statements by the German and French
delegates at the Convention indicated their approval of including
purely mental injuries under Article 17.140
" Gilbert, No. 85-4157 (Westlaw, Genfed Library, Dist file).
134 Id.
,35 Floyd, 872 F.2d 1462 cited with approval in Gilbert, No. 85-4157 (Westlaw,
Genfed Library, Dist file).
136 39 RFDA 232 (Israel S.C. 1985), reviewed by Gain, supra note 119, at 230.
This case was a result of the hijacking at Entebbe, Uganda. Another case in the
American courts that dealt with the detention of hostages in the airport building at
Entebbe was Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17 Gam, supra note 115, at 230.
138 Id.
139 Id. It remains to be seen whether the European courts will be ready for a
similar construction of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
140 Mankiewicz, 4 ANNALS oF An & SPACE L. 187 (1979) (including a deposition
of himself as an expert witness in trial litigation).
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To be sure, other foreign cases have held that the French meaning
controls in cases of conflict between the French terms and the cor-
responding translated term. In Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Air-
ways, the highest court of Great Britain held that the official French
text of the Warsaw Convention prevails when inconsistent with the
corresponding English text. 14' Additionally, an English court in Roth-
mans of Pall Mall (Overseas) Ltd. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines
Corporation142 recognized that the original French text is the only
text to have international authenticity, prompting one commentator
to write that, "Every schoolboy knows [that] ... the French text
prevails over the English in case of inconsistency."' 43 Article 36 of
the Warsaw Convention recognizes the French text as the controlling
version of the treaty.'" Yet, as previously mentioned, some courts
remain reluctant to comply with this mandate.
A major problem in analyzing the French text of the Convention
is determining just what is the legal meaning of the French text. A
British court in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines only recently expressed
its approval of even discussing foreign judgments and writers. 45 An
Italian case, Coccia v. THY, has even shown hostility to the French
text of the Convention by holding that parts of the Convention were
unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable in Italian courts.'" The
Floyd and Saks decisions, however, demonstrate the willingness of
United States courts to resort to the meaning of a term as expressed
in French decisions and commentary. 47
Asian countries have failed to hand down decisions affecting the
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention.'" Because the Warsaw
.4. 1 Q.B. 616, 652 (1968).
342 3 All E.R. 359, 368 (1980).
41 Kean, Forum Shopping: An Unsuccessful Attempt, J. OF Bus. L. Mar. 1981,
at 148-49.
- Article 36 states:
This convention is drawn up in French in a single copy which shall remain
deposited in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland.
and of which one duly certified copy shall be sent by the Polish Government
to the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 36.
5 3 W.L.R. 491 (1979); Schoner, Partial Loss as Damage; Recourse to Travaux
Prkparatoires: Fothergil v. Monarch Airlines (House of Lords), 6 AIR L. 40, 42
(1981).
- Coccia v. THY, Rac. uff. corte const., Italy, Decision No. 132-1985; Guerreri,
The Warsaw System Italian Style: Convention Without Limits, 10 Am L. 294 (1985).
'47 Floyd, 872 F.2d 1462; Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
"' Lee, The Current Status of the Warsaw Convention and Subsequent Protocols
in Leading Asian Countries, 11 Am L. 242 (1986).
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system was originally promulgated by western nations, many Asian
countries were unaware of the Convention until their own air carriers
began offering international service. 49 Accordingly, the Convention's
application and interpretation is in its infancy stages relative to those
countries which have adhered to the Convention for many years,
Korea and Japan being the two most prominent countries affected.,"
There is thus very little published information concerning the con-
struction of the Warsaw Convention by the various Asian courts and
governments. 5'
Although a cause of action was found to exist in Floyd, it should
not be forgotten that the liability limitation of the Convention still
applies to any resulting judgment."12 That limitation was the major
goal behind the treaty and it still provides the airlines with a definitive
ceiling on their potential liability.'53 The plaintiffs will also not be
able to pursue any other remedies because, under the Supremacy.
Clause,5 4 the Convention is found to preempt all state law causes
,,9 Id. Currently, most of the Asian countries are parties to the Warsaw Convention
as well as to the Hague Protocol. However, because the Convention has only recently
become important to Asian countries, there is little published information about the
various court decisions and government treatment thereof by Asian governments.
Id.
,50 [M]ost of the countries in Asia are parties to both the Warsaw Con-
vention and the Hague Protocol. However, the Republic of Korea and
Mongolia are parties only to the Hague Protocol, while Burma, Indonesia
and Sri Lanka are parties only to the Warsaw Convention. Thailand and
Taiwan are not parties to the Convention or Protocol. Among Asian states,
Indonesia, the Philippines and Pakistan are also parties to the Guadalajara
Convention, but no country in Asia has signed the Guatemala City Protocol
of 1971 or the Montreal Additional Protocols, which Protocols have not
yet been put into force. Id.
The People's Republic of China has declared that the Warsaw Convention
shall apply to the entire Chinese territory, including Taiwan. However, the
Taiwan Government has its own law entitled, "Rules of Compensation for
Damages to Passengers and Cargo by Air," promulgated in 1974.
As to the enforcement of such international agreements, Korea and Japan treat
those to which they are parties as part of their own domestic law; while Pakistan
and Malaysia for example, have enacted separate domestic laws to put such inter-
national agreements into effect.
Id. at 242-43.
132 Warsaw Convention, supra note 6.
153 Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, arts. 1, 17 and 22. Note, Aviation: Liability
Limitations for Wrongful Death or Personal Injury-A Contemporary Analysis of
the Warsaw System, 10 BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 381, 382-84 (1984) (hereinafter Brooklyn
Note).
"4 U.S. CONST. art VI cl. 2. (the Supremacy Clause). The Warsaw Convention
as an international treaty accepted by the United States forms a part of the Supreme
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of action. In cases such as Floyd, however, those passengers who
suffer emotional injuries may still be able to recover a complete
remedy for their psychological scars if their damages do not exceed
the Convention's liability limitations."' In essence, the Convention
can now be used to expand the ability of injured passengers to recover
compensation by allowing them to recover for their mental suffer.
ings. m5
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of the Floyd decision lies not in its declaration of
a binding interpretation of Ision corporelle, for it will only bind
those cases brought within the Eleventh Circuit. Instead, Floyd shows
that American courts are willing to take an expansive look at the
policies underlying the Convention and are broadening their views
of the means by which the Convention should be applied. Previously,
the United States had denounced the treaty,5 7 yet after the Montreal
Agreement, it began interpreting the treaties literally. 58 After the Saks
and Floyd decisions though, the trend in United States courts appears
to be not only to interpret the terms of the Convention broadly, but
to view the policies underlying the Convention itself from the framers'
perspectives. Such decisions are positive steps towards interpreting
the Convention in a manner consistent with the drafters' original
intent. Such steps should be continued to ensure the treaty will be
interpreted in a way parallel to that of the other signatory countries.
Mental injuries unaccompanied by physical trauma have only re-
cently been recognized as compensable under the common law.5 9
Under the Warsaw Convention's compensation scheme, however,
those damages may not be fully recoverable under the Convention's
law of the land, preempting contrary state and local laws. Domanque v. Eastern
Airlines, 722 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1984); Dalton v. Delta Airlines, 570 F.2d 1244,
1246 (5th Cir. 1978) ("as an international treaty accepted by the United States, the
Warsaw Convention is absolutely binding"). Any state law in conflict with a treaty
of the United States is invalid. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-
58 (1978).
- Depending on the amount of damages proven at trial, many cases may have
damages totaling less than the $75,000 limitation imposed by the Convention, as
amended by the Montreal Agreement.
116 Brooklyn Note, supra note 153, at 399-400.
',7 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 39.
,S Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17.
" W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, sec. 54 (5th
ed. 1984).
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liability limitations. 16 For years, the United States has desired changes
in these limitations so that the limitations might better correspond
to other areas of law. Such limitations imposed by the Convention
have traditionally been difficult to modify, as evidenced by the United
States only being able to do so on two occasions over the fifty-five
years that the treaty has been recognized. 16' Courts in the United
States now have the Saks and Floyd decisions as persuasive authority
by which to alter the Convention's scope of coverage through judicial
reinterpretation. As a result, plaintiffs will be able to recover under
a wider range of circumstances. Given the limitations imposed, such
a result is desireable.
The airline industry is no longer fledgling, as it was at the time
that the Convention was promulgated. It should be required to answer
for the damages it causes. In contrast to their predecessors, airlines
today are better able to spread the costs of liability exposure and
prevention. Additionally, unlike international flights, no limitations
are imposed on recoveries for damages sustained on domestic flights,
and in such cases the airlines have had to pay full compensation to
victims. In international flights, the limitations unfortunately still
exist. However, after the Floyd decision, plaintiffs will be better able
to recover for mental injuries, as well as the traditional physical
injuries. To those victims of airline mishaps, the result is more fair
than that which existed prior to Floyd.
Regardless of the limitations, damages for mental injuries unac-
companied by physical trauma resulting from an "accident" occurring
while an individual is on an international flight should be compen-
sable. Recent case law has uniformly recognized the compensability
of purely mental injuries in other types of cases. The rationale no
longer exists for the doctrine to be ignored in cases covered by the
Convention. The Floyd court has aggressively reached for that result
by allowing compensation for such mental injuries and in doing so
has expanded the scope of the Convention. More importantly, the
Floyd holding has shown a United States court's ability and willingness
to sift through years of inaccurate precedents to lead the countries
adhering to the Convention to an interpretation of the treaty which
o For example, if it could be shown that the plaintiff has incurred damages in
excess of the limitation imposed by the Warsaw Convention as amended by the
Montreal Agreement ($75,000 U.S.), then the plaintiff could only recover up to the
stated limit.
161 Hague Protocol, supra note 20; see also Montreal Agreement, supra note 15.
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should have been followed from the Convention's inception. Although
the holding was inevitable, it is a disquieting tribute to the wheels
of justice that it took six decades for an American circuit court to
make such a change.'6
Larry Johnson
,62 Petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court on June 4, 1990.
Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1467 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
2585 (1990).
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